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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Samuel Barnes was charged with burglary and petit theft, and exercised his right
to a jury trial. He was convicted of both offenses and was sentenced to concurrent
sentences of six years, with two years fixed, for his conviction of burglary and 120 days
for his conviction of petit theft. The district court retained jurisdiction, but subsequently
relinquished jurisdiction and executed Mr. Barnes' original sentences.

Mr. Barnes

thereafter filed a motion for a reduction of his burglary sentence pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 (hereinaffer, Rule 35). The district court denied this motion.
Mr. Barnes timely appealed from his judgment of conviction and raised three
issues on appeal: whether the district court abused its discretion when it admitted
cumulative testimony from several witnesses identifying the figure in a surveillance
video as Mr. Barnes; whether the prosecutor committed misconduct when he elicited
testimony about a witness's opinion of Mr. Barnes' guilt or innocence and of his
character; and whether the district court abused its discretion when it permitted hearsay
evidence from a witness despite an objection by Mr. Barnes. Additionally, Mr. Barnes
asserted that, even if these errors are deemed harmless when taken in isolation, the
cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial.
The State responded that the lay opinion testimony of several witnesses who
stated their opinion that Mr. Barnes was the individual on the surveillance tape was
proper because these witnesses were familiar with Mr. Barnes and because there was
other testimony indicating that Mr. Barnes' appearance was different at trial than at the
time of the taped burglary. (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) The State never responded to

Mr. Barnes' contention that this evidence should have been stricken, at least in part,
because it was cumulative.

(Appellant's Brief, p.18; Vol. 1 Tr., p.159, Ls.17-24.)

Regarding the issue of the admission of George Keenworthy's hearsay testimony, the
State counters that this testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted,
but was instead offered to show "context." (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) The State
also relies on this interpretation of the testimony of Mr. Keenworthy to assert that the
prosecutor in this case did not attempt to elicit a statement regarding Mr. Keenworthy's
opinion of Mr. Barnes' guilt, and therefore the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in
this case.
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify the nature of Mr. Barnes' actual claims on
appeal and to further clarify that the record in this case does not support the
interpretation of Mr. Keenworthy's testimony being urged by the State.

While

Mr. Barnes continues to assert that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of
a fair trial, he will rely on the arguments presented in his Appellant's Brief and will not
reiterate those arguments herein.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Barnes Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted lay testimony from
several witnesses expressing an opinion as to the identity of an individual
captured on a surveillance tape when the video was provided to the jury and only
one of the witnesses provided any additional information that would otherwise
assist the trier of fact in making the determination of the identity of the person
depicted on the surveillance video?

2.

Did the district court err when it permitted the State to introduce a witness's prior
out-of-court statements because these statements were offered as proof of the
matter asserted and Mr. Barnes objected to these statements as hearsay?

3.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when he deliberately elicited testimony
regarding a witness's prior statements expressing an opinion of Mr. Barnes' guilt
and his character?

ARGUMENT

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted Lay Testimony From Several
Witnesses Expressinq An Opinion As To The ldentitv Of An Individual Captured On A
Surveillance Tape When The Video Was Provided To The Juw And Only One Of The
Witnesses Provided Any Additional Information That Would Otherwise Assist The Trier
Of Fact In Makinq The Determination Of The Identity Of The Person Depicted On The
Surveillance Video
A.

Introduction
Mr. Barnes has asserted on appeal that the admission of testimony from several

lay witnesses, none of whom witnessed the actual burglary at issue in this case,
identifying Mr. Barnes as the individual depicted on a surveillance tape was error. Only
one of the witnesses who testified provided the jury with any additional information that
would assist the jury in determining whether it was more or less likely that Mr. Barnes
was the individual depicted on the surveillance video, and the one witness who did
provide vague statements as to a change in Mr. Barnes' appearance did not provide
information regarding that change in appearance that would otherwise assist the trier of
fact.
In response, the State asserts that these witnesses were familiar with
Mr. Barnes, and that another witness had testified as to a statement from Mr. Barnes
regarding how his appearance differed from that of the person depicted on the
surveillance video. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-6.)

However, the State's argument is

misplaced because much of the relevant case law relied on by both Mr. Barnes and the
State indicates that the content of testimony of the witnesses must, itself, contain
additional information that would assist the jury in determining the identification of the

individual depicted on a surveillance tape in order for such identification testimony to be
admissible.

Moreover, because the jury was provided with a photograph that the

prosecutor asserted was what Mr. Barnes looked like at the time of the offense, the
testimony identifying Mr. Barnes as the individual on the surveillance tape should not
have been admitted. In light of the record in this case, the district court abused its
discretion when it admitted the lay opinion testimony of several witnesses purporting to
identify Mr. Barnes as the individual depicted in the video surveillance tape that was
subsequently provided to the jury.

B.

The Testimonv Of Nearly All Of The State's Witnesses ldentifyina Mr. Barnes As
The Individual Depicted On The Surveillance Tape Did Not Include Any
Additional Information That Would Assist The Jurv In Determining The Identity Of
The Individual Depicted On The Surveillance Tape And, Therefore. The
Admission Of This Testimony Was Error
The issue of the admissibility of lay witness opinion testimony, by witnesses who

did not observe the actual commission of the offense, regarding the identity of a person
depicted on a surveillance tape which has also been provided to the jury invades upon
the function and province of the jury as the fact-finder is an issue of first impression in
Idaho. In light of this, both Mr. Barnes and the State have looked to the holdings of
other jurisdictions for guidance on this issue. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-18; Respondent's
Brief, pp.5-6.) The State has asserted that the relevant case law from other jurisdictions
cited as persuasive precedent for this Court supports the admissibility of the testimony
at issue in this case.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.)

However, a review of this

persuasive precedent and the record in this case does not bear out this assertion.
Four separate witnesses were called upon to render their lay opinion as to the
identity of the person depicted on the surveillance tape of the burglary: John Cowie,

Rachel Orand, Tabitha Clausen, and George Keenworthy.' (Vol. 1 Tr., p.115, Ls.1-18;
p.126, Ls.18-22; p.173, Ls.11-20; p.213, Ls.15-21.) As has been previously noted,
Mr. Cowie, Ms. Orand, and Ms. Clausen did not appear to have any greater familiarity
with Mr. Barnes than the jury would have by the time of the close of evidence.
(Appellant's Brief, p.16, Vol. ITr., p.153, Ls.12-23.) None of the witnesses identified
any special mannerisms or features that led them to conclude Mr. Barnes was the
person depicted on the surveillance tape. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.115, Ls.1-18; p.126, L18
p.128, L.2; p.171, L.3 - p.173, L.20; p.210, Ls.5-15; p.213, Ls.15-21.)

-

Only one

witness, Ms. Orand, provided any information regarding a change in Mr. Barnes'
appearance between the time of the burglary and the time of trial

- that

Mr. Barnes

"[looked] like he lost weight. He has a different haircut." (Vol. 1 Tr., p.127, L.22 p.128, L.2.) As has been noted in the Appellant's Brief, this statement provides little, if
any, information of the assistance to the jury. (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-18.)
Much of the case law relied on by other jurisdictions confronted with the issue of
the admissibility of lay opinion identification testimony of an individual in a surveillance
video generally require that this testimony establish both the particular familiarity of the
lay witness with the defendant and a change in appearance or other identifying feature
that the jury would not otherwise be able to discern upon a review of the videotape
evidence. See, e.g., Sanders v. US., 809 A.2d 584, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Dawson v.
Sfafe, 658 S.E.2d 755, 760 (Ga. 2008); Rosanna v. Sfate, 934 P.2d 1045, 1048-1049
(Nev. 1997).

'

In these cases, the testimony of the lay witnesses included those

A fifth witness, Sherilyn Bell, was also asked whether she could identify the person
depicted on the surveillance video, but she indicated that she could not make an
identification from the recording. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.98, Ls.8-14.)

identifying features of the defendant, or described the defendant's change in
appearance, that would not otherwise be apparent to the jury and this testimony was
therefore deemed to be helpful to the jury's understanding. Id.
Here, nearly all of the witnesses testifying as to their opinion of the identity of the
person on the surveillance tape did not support that identification with any information
that was beyond the ken of the jury, such as identifying features that the jury would not
otherwise be aware of or a particular change in appearance, within their testimony. The
fact that Mr. Barnes did not think, upon being confronted with a still from the
surveillance video, that he looked like the person depicted does not remedy this
deficiency in the testimony of the witnesses, as has been suggested by the State. (See
Respondent's Brief, p.6.)
Additionally, the State provided the jury with a photograph of Mr. Barnes'
appearance at the time of the burglary. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.190, L . l l

- p.191, L.5;p.263,

Ls.17-18; State's Exhibit 11; Appellant's Brief, pp.17-18.) Even if this Court were to
assume that there was a substantial change in appearance that would otherwise render
Ms. Orand's lay opinion testimony regarding her identification of Mr. Barnes' admissible,
the jury was provided with a picture of what Mr. Barnes' appearance was at the time of
the alleged offense.

As such, this change in appearance would no longer be

inaccessible to the jury and Ms. Orand's testimony would not provide any assistance to
the trier of fact. See Grimes V. State, 662 S.E.2d 346, 353 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
In light of the underlying record in this case, the district court abused its
discretion when it admitted the lay opinion testimony of several witnesses purporting to

identify Mr. Barnes as the individual depicted in the video surveillance tape that was
subsequently provided to the jury.

The District Court Erred When It Permitted The State To Introduce A Witness's Prior
Out-Of-Court Statements Because These Statements Were Offered As Proof Of The
Matter Asserted And Mr. Barnes' Obiected To These Statements As Hearsay:
A.

Introduction
Mr. Barnes has challenged on appeal the admission of several out-of-court

statements made by Mr. Keenworthy, admitted over Mr. Barnes' hearsay objections,
that were made to police officers. These included statements that Mr. Keenworthy
thought Mr. Barnes was a "clown" and that Mr. Keenworthy probably had stated to
police that Mr. Barnes was guilty of the charges at issue in this case. These statements
were being offered as proof of the matter asserted and did not provide context for the
conversation or for Mr. Keenworthy's identification.
B.

Mr. Keenworthy's Prior Out-Of-Court Statements Renardinn His Opinion Of
Mr. Barnes' Guilt And His Character Were Offered Bv The Prosecutor As Proof
Of The Matter Asserted, And These Statements Therefore Should Have Been
Excluded As Impermissible Hearsav Evidence
As an initial matter, Mr. Barnes wishes to clarify for this Court the scope of the

testimony of Mr. Keenworthy that is actually at issue in this appeal. The State has
suggested that Mr. Barnes objected to the entirety of Mr. Keenworthy's testimony, citing
to page 22 of the Appellant's Brief. (Respondent's Brief, p.1I.) Mr. Barnes did, at one
point on this page, cite to the entirety of Mr. Keenworthy's testimony, but not in the
context of objecting to the entirety of this testimony as impermissible hearsay.

(Appellant's Brief, p.22.) This citation was made in support the fact that nothing in any
of Mr. Keenworthy's testimony at any point supports the finding that Mr. Keenworthy's
prior statements fell under the non-hearsay categories as outlined in I.R.E. 801(d)(l).
(Appellant's Brief, p.22.) Mr. Barnes does not cite to the entirety of Mr. Keenworthy's
testimony when discussing the actual hearsay claims being raised on appeal, but rather
has directed this Court to the portions of the transcript containing his prior out-of-court
statements. (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-23.)
Regarding the substantive issue of the admissibility of Mr. Keenworthy's out-ofcourt statements at trial, the State has suggested that these remarks were only put forth
in order to establish the "context" of Mr. Keenworthy's identification of Mr. Barnes as the
individual captured on a still image of the surveillance video.

(Respondent's Brief,

p.12.) It is worth noting that the State has characterized all of Mr. Keenworthy's prior
out-of-court statements as involving his relationship with Mr. Barnes. (Respondent's
Brief, p l . )

While these statements partly dealt with Mr. Keenworthy's prior

relationship with Mr. Barnes, they were by no means limited to this subject matter.
In particular, the prosecutor asked Mr. Keenworthy whether he made statements
regarding his personal belief in Mr. Barnes' guilt and his character. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.212,
L.23

- p.213,

L.5.) The following exchange took place between the prosecutor and

Mr. Keenworthy:
PROSECUTOR:

Okay. Did you say anything about [Mr. Barnes'] reputation?

MR. KEENWORTHY:
PROSECUTOR:

Oh, I'm sure I did.

,

Did you say, and I quote, "Ibet he did it"?

MR. KEENWORTHY:

Very possibly, yes.

PROSECUTOR:

Okay. Did you call him a clown?

MR. KEENWORTHY:

Yes.

(Vol. 1 Tr., p.212, L.23-p.213, L.5.)
While the district court indicated, after Mr. Barnes' initial objection to the
presentation of Mr. Keenworthy's prior out-of-court statements as hearsay, that these
statements were not being offered for proof of the matter asserted, but instead went to
show the "context of the conversation," it is not clear that the district court maintained
this rationale when it denied Mr. Barnes' subsequent hearsay objections. (Vol. 1 Tr.,
p.210, L.22

- p.211,

L.19.) However, even if this Court were to assume that all of the

hearsay statements were deemed admissible by the district court to show the context of
the conversation, the district court's ruling that these statements were admissible would
nevertheless be erroneous. First, what the prosecutor in this case was seeking to offer
was not the context of the conversation, but the substance of the conversation itself.
(Vol. 1 Tr., p.211, Ls.1-3.) Additionally, the statements made by Mr. Keenworthy
regarding h k personal opinion of Mr. Barnes' guilt or Mr. Barnes' bad character do not
provide a context for anything. The only thing these statements were being offered to
establish was the substance of the statements themselves -that Mr. Keenworthy knew
the defendant, believed the defendant had poor character, and believed that the
defendant was guilty. (Vol. 1 Tr., p.210, L.22 - p.211, L.19.) Such a use of prior out-ofcourt statements is, by definition, hearsay and the district court erred when it permitted
the State to elicit this testimony. See I.R.E. 801(c), 802.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Deliberatelv Elicited Testimony
Reqardina A Witness's Prior Statements Expressina An Opinion Of Mr. Barnes' Guilt
And His Character
A.

Introduction
Contrary to the State's assertion on appeal, the statements deliberately elicited

by the prosecutor regarding Mr. Keenworthy's personal opinion of Mr. Barnes' character
and his guilty of the charged offenses were not elicited in order to show the context of
Mr. Keenworthy's conversation with police or of his identification of Mr. Barnes from the
still image of the surveillance tape. These remarks were elicited in order to place before

I
1

the jury the substance of what Mr. Keenworthy had represented to police

- that

he

thought Mr. Barnes had a poor character and that this witness personally believed that

j

I

Mr. Barnes was guilty of the offense. The purposeful elicitation of these remarks was
therefore prosecutorial misconduct that rose to the level of a fundamental error in this
case.

1

B.
I
I

I

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Deliberatelv Elicited Testimony
Reaardina A Witness's Prior Statements Expressina An Opinion Of Mr. Barnes'
Guilt And His Character
Mr. Barnes has asserted that the prosecutor in this case committed misconduct

that rose to the level of a fundamental error when the prosecutor deliberately elicited
improper hearsay statements from Mr. Keenworthy that were specifically directed at

I

Mr. Keenworthy's personal opinion as to Mr. Barnes' guilt and his bad character.

1

(Appellant's Brief, pp.24-29.)

The State has responded that this testimony was not

hearsay, and that the prosecutor was merely seeking to provide the context of
Mr. Keenworthy's identification of Mr. Barnes. (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-15.)
As has been noted, the out-of-court statements wherein Mr. Keenworthy stated
that he thought Mr. Barnes was guilty and that Mr. Barnes was a "clown" does not
provide any context as to Mr. Keenworthy's identification, but was merely offered by the
prosecutor to show that Mr. Keenworthy was familiar with the defendant, thought he
was a bad person, and believed that Mr. Barnes was guilty of the offense. (See Point II
(B) supra; Vol. 1 Tr., p.212, L.23 - p.213, L.5.) This is not only an improper hearsay
purpose for admitting Mr. Keenworthy's out-of-court statements, but the remarks
regarding the witness's opinion of Mr. Barnes' guilt and his bad character are also
improper because these remarks called upon the jury to base its verdicts on factors
outside of the evidence and appealed to the passions and prejudice of the jury.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.25-29.) The deliberate elicitation of these out-of-court statements
was prosecutorial misconduct that rose to the level of a fundamental error in this case.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Barnes respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's
judgment of conviction and sentence in this case and remand this case for fur the^
proceedings.
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